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Implications
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court's 2018 decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair
removed the settled physical presence requirement for state taxation of out-
of-state businesses. This kept states from taxing remote-and often small-
sellers who had no stores, no warehouses, and no other connection to the
state other than its sales to the state's citizens. Because the Court has done
away with the requirement that businesses be physically located within a
state before they can be taxed, states may now impose sales and use taxes
on businesses whose only link to the state are predominately online
transactions. Big companies like Amazon will no longer be able to hide
behind a large online presence to avoid state sales and use taxes, but the
real consequence of the decision lies with the underdogs: these taxes will
impact small sellers disproportionately hard, as they must now navigate the
copious amounts of taxing regulations across the country.
The Wayfair decision will mean confronting new issues in the near
future. Its retreat to a substantial nexus requirement remains more
ambiguous than ever in an online era and will result in an erosion of the
Dormant Commerce Clause. The solution now lies with our democratic
process. If the Court does not overturn Wayfair and we do not amend the
Constitution-solutions which, though not impossible, are improbable-the
responsibility falls on state citizens to ensure that out-of-state businesses
are not unduly taxed. This Comment examines the Wayfair decision in
light of the Dormant Commerce Clause's history and purpose and argues
that the physical presence rule was wrongly overturned, a decision only we
can now correct.
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INTRODUCTION
Of Congress's enumerated powers, none has had more historical,
political, and economic influence than its power to regulate interstate
commerce. Article I of the Constitution states that Congress shall have the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States."1 These few
words have been the basis of countless federal statutory schemes that have
regulated everything from the wheat market to racial discrimination.2 The
Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause aids Congress in utilizing its
powers under the Commerce Clause, as it grants Congress the power to
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers." 3  The most well-known cases in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence raise the following questions: What does
commerce mean? When does commerce become interstate commerce?
What does it really mean to regulate that commerce?4  The Tenth
Amendment theoretically functions as a limit to Congress's Commerce
power. However, reality has proven that Congress can reach essentially
any aspect of American life through the Commerce Clause, simply because
everything that Americans do crosses state lines at some point.
The Supreme Court has also recognized a limit on the states' power to
regulate activity-a limit that is inherent in the nature of the Commerce
Clause. This limit is termed the "negative" Commerce Clause, or the
Dormant Commerce Clause. The Dormant Commerce Clause functions as
a practical restraint: "[T]o prevent the states-in the absence of
congressional action-from creating insurmountable barriers among
themselves, thereby eradicating the unity that the Framers of our
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(regulating racial discrimination); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (regulating the
wheat market).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
4. Of particular importance in recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence is Nat'l Fed'n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), in which the Court held that Congress could
not create commerce in order to regulate it.
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Constitution strove to create." 5 Thus, the Dormant Commerce Clause
mandates that, regardless of whether Congress has chosen to exercise its
power through specific legislation, a state cannot regulate activity that
constitutes interstate commerce. Consequently, in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois,
the Court held that for a state to be able to tax businesses that ship goods
into that state, the business had to have a physical presence in that state:
e.g., a manufacturing plant or a store.6 Otherwise, the state would
impermissibly regulate interstate commerce, a power specifically granted to
Congress by the Constitution. Today, because many people order products
online rather than shop in physical stores, states' sales and use tax bases are
plummeting under the Quill and Bellas Hess rule. Recently, in South
Dakota v. Wayfair, the Court overruled those cases, holding that states are
no longer prohibited under the Dormant Commerce Clause from taxing
businesses which do business in that state but do not have a physical
presence there.7
I argue that the Court's overruling of Quill and Bellas Hess was an
erroneous decision, with grave implications not only for Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but also for small businesses and our
Constitutional structure of federalism. Part I of this Comment will trace the
history of the Commerce Clause and Dormant Commerce Clause, including
the analysis under Quill and Bellas Hess. Part II will examine the Wayfair
decision and the Court's reasoning. Part HI addresses the Wayfair
decision's implications and consequences, ultimately concluding that the
Court hastily overruled Quill and Bellas Hess at the expense of several
hundred years of settled Commerce Clause analysis. Part IV will offer a
solution to this issue, which now primarily falls on the people and the local
political process.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND ITS PROGENY
The Commerce Clause has provided the basis for Congress's
regulation of interstate activity since the Constitution's adoption. Over the
centuries, the Court has gradually expanded the scope of Congress's reach
under this clause, allowing the national government to regulate private,
5. Amy M. Petragnani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg,
57 ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1215 (1994).
6. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317-19 (1992); Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc.
v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967).
7. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
2019]
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intrastate conduct on a national scale.' At the same time, the Court has
consistently held that states may not pass legislation that will impinge
Congress's power to regulate commerce across the states, even if Congress
has not yet done so.9 Analyzing the Court's winding road under the
Commerce Clause is an interesting, thought-provoking experiment, but
perhaps the best place to begin is with the Court's first seminal case
regarding the scope of the states' power under the Commerce Clause in
Gibbons v. Ogden.1 o
A. The Commerce Clause
In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court invalidated a New York statute that
allowed two men, Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston, to navigate water
exclusively by steamboat between New York and New Jersey. 11 Thomas
Gibbons, the owner of a ferry business, claimed he had the right to operate
his business between the two states because his license came from the
federal government.12 This was the Court's first opportunity to examine
the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Marshall, first
concluded that "commerce" includes navigation;13  "commerce" is
"intercourse";14 "among" means "intermingled."' 5 Furthermore, this power
is intrinsically expansive, tied to Congress in its role as the representative
of all American people:
What is this power?
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in
Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution .... If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects,
the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
8. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(regulating private, intrastate racial discrimination).
9. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 338 (2007) ("Although the Constitution does not in terms limit the power of States
to regulate commerce, we have long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit
restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.").
10. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
11. Id. at 220-21.
12. Id. at 25-26.
13. Id. at 190-91.
14. Id. at 190.
15. Id. at 194.
[Vol. 41:531
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States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single
government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise
of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The
wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and
the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in
many other instances ... the sole restraints on which they have relied, to
secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people
must often rely solely, in all representative governments. 
16
Since the Court's decision in Gibbons, Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has resembled a roller coaster. Until the "switch in time that
saved nine" in 1937,17 the Court's approach to the Commerce Clause
became more restrictive than Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons
and the decisions that soon followed. For example, in United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., the Court held that Congress could not regulate the
manufacturing of sugar through the Sherman Anti-Trust Act because
manufacturing is not commerce.18 In Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court
held that Congress could not prohibit interstate shipment of goods
produced through child labor because that was within the states' police
power.19 In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Court invalidated certain wage
and hour regulations for coal miners because mining is not commerce."
The Court stated, "That commodities produced or manufactured within a
state are intended to be sold or transported outside the state does not render
their production or manufacture subject to federal regulation under the
[C]ommerce [C]lause."' l
However, in 1937, the Court returned to its expansive approach. In
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court upheld a federal law
allowing the National Labor Relations Board to regulate unfair labor
practices.22 In United States v. Darby, the Court overruled its decision in
Hammer and held that Congress could prohibit the interstate shipment of
16. Id. at 196-97.
17. The "switch in time that saved nine" is a reference to President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's attempt to pack the United State Supreme Court in 1937. Justice Roberts of the
Supreme Court, a conservative who had invalidated New Deal legislation, suddenly voted
with the liberal justices to uphold a state law establishing a minimum wage, avoiding the
need for Roosevelt's court-reform legislation; see generally Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told
Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARv. L. REv. 620 (1994).
18. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1895).
19. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918), overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
20. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936).
21. Id. at 301.
22. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937).
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goods produced at wages and hours below the federal standard.23 In a
seminal Commerce Clause case, Wickard v. Filburn, the Court held that
Congress could regulate wholly intrastate activity so long as the activity, in
the aggregate, substantially affected interstate commerce.24 The Court
explained that it did not matter if the intrastate activity was designated as
"production," "consumption," or "marketing. ' 25 The activity, "whatever its
nature, [can] be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect
is. . . 'direct' or 'indirect."' 26 Wickard vastly increased Congress's
Commerce power. Congress could now regulate completely intrastate
activity, even noneconomic activity, so long as its aggregate effect
substantially touched the realm of interstate commerce.
By the time Wickard was decided, the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence had firmly established that Congress could regulate the
channels and the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.27 Then, in 1995,
the Court decided United States v. Lopez.28 In Lopez, the Court held
unconstitutional a federal law making it a crime to have a gun within one
thousand feet of a school. 29 This case marked the Court's return to a more
restrained approach: in Lopez, the relationship between guns' presence
within 1,000 feet of a school and the interstate market was just too strained
to constitute a substantial effect.3" A few years later, in United States v.
Morrison, the Court again held a federal law unconstitutional-one that
allowed victims of gender-motivated violence to sue the culprit for
23. Darby, 312 U.S. at 117, 123.
24. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942). In Wickard, the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 controlled the amount of wheat farmers could produce in order to
regulate the national wheat market, avoiding exceptionally high or low wheat prices. Id. at
115-16. Filburn, a wheat farmer, sold some wheat on the market but retained a portion for
personal consumption and for planting during the next season. Id. at 114. This activity
remained within Ohio, and was therefore wholly intrastate activity. Id.
25. Id. at 124.
26. Id. at 125.
27. See generally Hous. E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate
Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (holding that Congress could regulate railroad rates as the
railroad is an instrumentality of interstate commerce); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery
Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding that Congress could prohibit the transporting of lottery
tickets from state to state as the transportation is conducted through the channels of
interstate commerce).
28. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
29. Id. at 551-52.
30. The Court noted that the piling on of "inference upon inference" needed to connect
the legislation to the interstate market would destroy the distinction between "what is truly
national and what is truly local." Id. at 567-68.
[Vol. 41:531
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monetary damages.31  The Court concluded that "[g]ender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity."32
Importantly, Lopez and Morrison involved Congressional regulation of
intrastate activity that was not economic in nature. Lopez and Morrison
therefore confirmed that Congress can regulate intrastate activity that is
economic in nature and that substantially affects interstate commerce.3 3
Furthermore, although these cases exemplify a recent trend back toward a
restrictive approach to the Commerce Clause, Congress is assuredly
granted generous authority to regulate activities through its Commerce
power.
Congress's use of the Commerce Clause to regulate private conduct is
often a way to achieve admirable results on a national scale. In many
cases, we might consider the possibility that the ends justify the means.
Still, there are some drawbacks to the Commerce Clause's expansive reach,
even if the objective is commendable. For example, in Katzenbach v.
McClung, Congress prohibited a restaurant from racially discriminating
against customers. 34 The Court held that Congress was permitted to
regulate this discriminatory conduct, which was noneconomic activity
conducted wholly within one state, because the restaurant bought food from
a local supplier who had gotten the food from another state.35 It is easy to
look back on such a decision and think that Congress's "broad and
sweeping" commerce power can only be a good thing, as it allows the
federal government to reach conduct that would otherwise be left to the
many state governments to control.3 6 However, in many ways, Congress's
power to control our intrastate conduct has gone too far. The Katzenbach
Court approved congressional regulation of purely private, noneconomic,
intrastate conduct based on a very thin line-by following a chain of goods
which had once-upon-a-time come from outside of the state.37
In recent years, the Court has shown a willingness to draw a line in the
sand. Notably, the Court in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius held the Commerce Clause could not support the Affordable
Care Act's individual mandate because it "compel[led] individuals to
31. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000).
32. Id. at 613.
33. "[T]hus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation of intrastate activity ... where that activity is economic in nature." Id.
34. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296-97, 302 (1964).
35. Id. at 304-05.
36. Id. at 305.
37. See id at 302 ("This Court has held time and again that this power extends to
activities of retail establishments, including restaurants, which directly or indirectly burden
or obstruct interstate commerce.").
20191
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become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that
their failure to do so affects interstate commerce."3 As some conservative
justices noted, "Whatever may be the conceptual limits upon the
Commerce Clause..., they cannot be such as will enable the Federal
Government to regulate all private conduct... ."" However, cases such as
Sebelius are few and far between. What is ultimately left after the
numerous cases regarding the Commerce Clause power's scope is the
notion that Congress can regulate many of our activities under the
Commerce Clause.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
The Dormant Commerce Clause further complicates matters.
Congress continuously retains an immense amount of power in its hands, a
power on which states occasionally stomp. The division between the
power of the national and state governments, therefore, creates an
interesting dilemma for the regulation of activities which effect interstate
commerce. Long ago, the Court in Gibbons recognized that there is a
unique relationship between the national and state governments under the
Commerce Clause, a concept which has become known as the Dormant
Commerce Clause: "[W]hen a State proceeds to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very power
that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is
authorized to do."4 As one scholar explains, Gibbons did not definitively
decide whether Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce was for
Congress alone.4 ' However, the Gibbons Court certainly considered it, and
did so by examining the power to tax.42 Chief Justice Marshall noted that
when states lay and collect taxes, "they are not doing what Congress is
empowered to do."' 43 Still, the Gibbons majority "suggested that States
may sometimes enact laws to regulate commerce, as long as the regulation
does not interfere with, or is not contrary to, an Act of Congress passed
pursuant to the Constitution.""'
Nothing in the Constitution expressly provides for the Dormant
Commerce Clause; "[r]ather, the Supreme Court has inferred this from the
38. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552 (2012).
39. Id. at 647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
40. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 199-200 (1824).
41. Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A
Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HALv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395, 405--06 (1998).
42. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 199-200.
43. Id. at 199.
44. Lawrence, supra note 41, at 409 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 41:531
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grant of power to Congress in Article I, §8, to regulate commerce among
the states."45  Since Gibbons, the Court has developed the Dormant
Commerce Clause guided by two theories: (1) to provide for an "economic
blueprint for the nation's economic functioning," and, (2) "to fulfill a
political vision of a federal government responsive to the needs of all
citizens while at the same time respecting and honoring the institutional
interests of the States."4 6 In other words, the Dormant Commerce Clause
allows for a uniform standard across the country and allows the federal
government to remain responsible for the needs of every citizen, guided
also by the principle that individual states should not be able to regulate the
activity of those who have no power to vote in that state.
The test under the Dormant Commerce Clause can be stated simply.
4 7
If the state law discriminates against out-of-state citizens, then it faces "'a
virtually per se rule of invalidity. '"'48 This presumption can only be
overcome if the state has no other means to advance its purpose.49 State
laws that do not discriminate are subject to a balancing test: "Where the
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits."5  Furthermore, discrimination
means that the state treats in-state and out-of-state economic interests
differently and in a way that benefits its own interests while burdening out-
of-state interests.5 1
Although there are many ways that a state statute could affect
interstate commerce, only a few discriminatory statutes actually survive
constitutional muster under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Maine v.
Taylor is a famous and rare exception to the general rule that a
discriminatory state statute is per se invalid.5 2 In Taylor, the Court upheld
a Maine statute that banned the importation of certain minnow used as
45. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 444 (5th ed.
2015).
46. Lawrence, supra note 41, at 411 (emphasis omitted and added).
47. Admittedly, the Dormant Commerce Clause is anything but simple. However, in
order to give only a simplified background, I will avoid a lengthy discussion of the many
rules embodied in the Dormant Commerce Clause.
48. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
49. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
338-39 (2007).
50. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
51. United Haulers Ass'n,, 550 U.S. at 338.
52. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986).
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bait."3 The operator of a bait business in Maine imported the prohibited
minnow into the state, where it was intercepted.54 Maine had banned the
fish because of the parasites it could bring to the state, which would harm
the state's native fish.15  The Court upheld the statute. While the
Commerce Clause "significantly limits the ability of States... to regulate
or otherwise burden the flow of interstate commerce, [] it does not elevate
free trade above all other values."56 Because the state's ban on importing
the baitfish served "legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be
served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives," this was not an
"arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce. ' 57
In a more typical case, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court
invalided a discriminatory state statute. 58 There, a New Jersey law
prohibited the importation of waste from other states. 59 The Court held this
statute violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because "it impose[d] on
out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving the State's
remaining landfill space."6 Significantly, "the State ha[d] overtly moved
to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons .... What
is crucial is the attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem
common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate
trade."61  These cases exemplify the Court's careful attempt under the
Dormant Commerce Clause to preserve congressional Commerce power,
while recognizing that the particular needs of various states often require
state legislators to act in such a way that necessarily affects interstate
commerce.
A state's imposition of sales taxes on interstate commerce is another
significant way a state can violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.62 A
state sales tax is a tax that is paid to the state as a consequence of selling
53. Id.
54. Id. at 132.
55. Id. at 141. ("First, Maine's population of wild fish.., would be placed at risk by
three types of parasites prevalent in out-of-state baitfish, but not common to wild fish in
Maine .... Second, normative species inadvertently included in shipments of live baitfish
could disturb Maine's aquatic ecology to an unpredictable extent by competing with native
fish for food or habitat, by preying on native species, or by disrupting the environment in
more subtle ways.").
56. Id. at 151.
57. Id.
58. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978).
59. Id. at 628.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See generally Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Losing Face But Gaining Power: State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 16 VA. TAX. REV. 347, 352-60 (1997).
[Vol. 41:531
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certain goods and services. Under a sales tax, the seller is the one
responsible for collecting the correct amount and turning it over to the
state. If it fails to do so, it is liable to the state for failing to pay the tax.63
The seller must collect the tax, payable to the state, even if the buyer is
located outside of the state.
Because of the unique interplay between the state's power to tax the
activities that go on inside its borders and Congress's virtually plenary
power to regulate interstate commerce, the Court has created a special rule.
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Court established the modem
test to determine when a state tax on out-of-state businesses is
constitutional even though it burdens interstate commerce.' The test has
four parts: (1) "[T]he tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State"; (2) the tax "is fairly apportioned"; (3) the tax "does
not discriminate against interstate commerce"; and, (4) the tax "is fairly
related to the services provided by the State."65 The state tax in Complete
Auto was a Mississippi tax collected from every person or business
conducting certain transportation activities in that state, imposed for "'the
privilege of doing business' within the State."'  The Court upheld the law
solely on the basis that the appellant had not challenged the nexus, the
apportionment, the discriminatory nature, or the relationship of the tax to
the "benefits provided the taxpayer. '6 7  The Court also overruled the
previous test used for such state taxes, which was "a blanket prohibition
against any state taxation imposed directly on an interstate transaction.
6 8
After Complete Auto, the new standard for determining the constitutionality
of state taxation schemes was set into motion, and the Court soon had the
opportunity to refine its newly created test.
C. Out-of-State Presence
In a couple significant cases, the Court attempted to define the first
prong of the Complete Auto test: the substantial nexus requirement. The
issue of whether there was a sufficient nexus between the taxed activity and
the state arose in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
69
63. See Lucas J. Opperman, Note, Challenging State Sales Tax Statutes on Electronic
Commerce Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 13 US: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y
511 (2017) (describing the mechanics of a sales tax).
64. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
65. Id. at 279.
66. Id. at 274 (ellipses omitted).
67. Id. at 287.
68. Id. at 280. See Spector Motor Services, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609
(1951), for the Court's previous test.
69. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
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and Quill Corporation v. North Dakota.7 ° In Bellas Hess, the Court held
that businesses that sent only mail orders into that state did not have a
substantial nexus with that state, and the state tax on those businesses
therefore violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.71 The Court noted that
it "has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and
payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is
by common carrier or the United States mail."72
In Quill, North Dakota imposed a tax on "'every person who
engage[d] in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in
th[e] state"' regarding "property purchased for storage, use, or consumption
within the State."73 Quill, a corporation and seller of office equipment and
supplies, delivered its goods into North Dakota, which were sold to entities
in that state through mail orders.74 The Court held that there was not a
substantial nexus, and therefore North Dakota could not constitutionally
impose such a tax.75 The Court also noted that "the continuing value of a
bright-line rule in this area and the doctrine and principles of stare
decisis indicate that the Bellas Hess rule remains good law."76 Importantly,
Quill emphasized the Court's limited role in light of Congress's commerce
power:
This aspect of our decision is made easier by the fact that the underlying
issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but
also one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve. No matter how
we evaluate the burdens that use taxes impose on interstate commerce,
Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions. Indeed, in recent
years Congress has considered legislation that would "overrule" the Bellas
Hess rule.... Congress is ... free to decide whether, when, and to what
extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to
collect use taxes.
70. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1992).
71. The business in this case, National Bellas Hess, sent catalogues into the state twice
a year. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 754. However, the business did not have any
office, warehouse, or any other property in that state, no salesmen, no telephone number,
and no other advertisements. Id.
72. Id. at 758.
73. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 302-03, 302 (second alteration in original) (citations
omitted). The state defined "regular or systematic" as "three or more advertisements within
a 12-month period." Id. at 303.
74. Id. at 302-03.
75. Id. at 315 n.8 ("We therefore conclude that Quill's licensing of software in this case
does not meet the 'substantial nexus' requirement of the Commerce Clause.").
76. Id. at 317.
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Congress has the power to protect interstate commerce from intolerable or
even undesirable burdens. In this situation, it may be that the better part of
both wisdom and valor is to respect the judgment of the other branches of
the Government. 77
As these cases explain, a business does not have a substantial nexus
with a state simply because it ships goods into that state, ordered through
mail order catalogues. Rather, Bellas Hess and Quill stand for the rule that
in order for a state to impose a tax on out-of-state businesses without
violating the Dormant Commerce Clause, the business must have a
"physical-presence" in that state. 78
What has emerged from Commerce Clause jurisprudence is a broad
and far-reaching congressional power over interstate commerce. It allows
the national government to regulate many private and wholly intrastate
activities, and is subject to the limited exception that states may also
regulate interstate commerce if they do not discriminate against out-of-state
citizens. If the state's burden on interstate commerce is a tax on out-of-
state citizens, then it is subject to a special test that asks whether there is a
substantial relationship between the taxed activity and the taxing state.
This dichotomy between state and national powers leaves the power to set
uniform standards in the hands of the representatives of citizens of all states
and ensures that states have a sufficiently important reason before they can
step into Congress's territory. With the outcome of the Wayfair decision,
however, the Court abandoned the substantial nexus requirement, uprooting
the existing relationship between the states and national government.
II. THE WA YFAIR DECISION
The national contention surrounding the Wayfair decision can be
attributed, in large part, to the political climate. Months before the Court
published its opinion in Wayfair, President Trump fervently criticized
Amazon 79 for its role in "putting many thousands of retailers out of
77. Id. at 318-19 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
78. Id. at 317. It should also be noted that Quill overruled a portion of Bellas Hess that
"suggested that such [physical] presence was not only sufficient for jurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause, but also necessary." Id. at 307. The Due Process discussion in both
cases concerned whether the Court had personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state
businesses. The relationship between the physical presence rule for Commerce Clause
analysis and personal jurisdiction is an interesting, but lengthy, endeavor to undertake. In
the interest of brevity, I will not address Due Process concerns.
79. AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2019).
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business[.]" 8  However, the concern over big businesses like Amazon
avoiding state taxes has been around for years before President Trump was
elected to office. The problem stemmed from the gradual transition from
shoppers buying goods in physical stores to buying goods predominately
online."' When shoppers buy in-person, the state has the ability to charge a
sales tax.82 However, because of the Court's decisions in Bellas Hess and
Quill, businesses that sell goods into a state did not pay sales taxes for
those goods unless they had a physical presence in that state, such as a
store, a warehouse, or an office. This created what is known as a "tax
shelter," a concept Justice White recognized in his Quill dissent: "[V]ery
questionable is the rationality of perpetuating a rule that creates an
interstate tax shelter .... I would think that protectionist rules favoring a
$180-billion-a-year industry might come within the scope of such
'structural concerns. " 83
Under Quill, businesses with a significant online presence but no
physical locations could avoid paying most state taxes. Businesses whose
presence depends on a physical location, however, had to pay state taxes in
all states in which they were located and in which there was an applicable
tax.84  Because the internet has given people unprecedented access to
online retailers in recent years, states simply could not require businesses to
pay state taxes in the same manner they could before the rise of the
internet.85 This tax shelter became a problem for states, significantly
eroding their tax bases.
South Dakota, in response to its dwindling tax base and absence of
state income tax, "put substantial reliance on its sales and use taxes for the
80. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITrER (Mar. 29, 2018, 4:57 AM),
https://perma.cc/6ERK-2VT7; see Chris Isidore, Trump vs. Amazon: Let's Set the Record
Straight, CNN (Apr. 13, 2018, 2:13 PM), https://perma.cc/57X5-B85T.
81. See, e.g., Heather Kelly, Internet Sales Tax: What You '7 Pay, and When, CNN:
Bus. (May 7, 2013, 12:07 PM), https://perma.cc/L6BQ-EXV5.
82. Currently, only five states do not have a sales tax. These states include Alaska,
Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Sandra Block, 5 States With No State
Sales Tax, KIPLINGER (Mar. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/25MB-Q7X8.
83. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 329 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
84. A business whose presence depends on a physical location would include mom-
and-pop stores and stores which are commonly found in shopping malls.
85. North Carolina is one of several states to have adopted an "Amazon law,"
obligating out-of-state retailers to pay the North Carolina sales and use taxes if the retailer
has a "click-through agreement" with an in-state retailer. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-
164.8(b)(3) (2017); Scott W. Gaylord & Andrew J. Haile, Constitutional Threats in the E-
Commerce Jungle: First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on Amazon
Laws and Use Tax Reporting Statutes, 89 N.C.L. REv. 2011, 2031-33 (2011).
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revenue necessary to fund essential services."86 In response, it enacted a
law requiring that "any seller selling tangible personal property, products
transferred electronically, or services for delivery into South Dakota" pay a
state tax "as if the seller had a physical presence in the state," provided that
the seller meet certain criteria.87 The seller satisfied the criteria if the
seller's gross revenue from South Dakota exceeded $100,000 per year, or if
the seller conducted more than 200 separate transactions in the previous
year with South Dakota. 8
South Dakota subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action against
Wayfair, Inc., Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg, Inc. to have the law
declared valid and enjoin the businesses so that they would have to register
for a license and pay the tax.89 These businesses are prominent online
retailers that "easily me[t] the minimum sales or transactions requirements
of the Act," but did not have a physical presence in South Dakota.9" The
state trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the businesses based
on Bellas Hess and Quill.9 The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's decision: "We see no distinction between the collection
obligations invalidated in Quill and those imposed by [the South Dakota
statute], and hold that the circuit court correctly applied the law when it
granted Sellers' motion for summary judgment." 92  The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari "to reconsider the scope and validity of
the physical presence rule mandated by [Quill and Bellas Hess] ."
The Court's majority opinion, written by the now-retired Justice
Kennedy, began by noting that, in an 1829 case, "the Court indicated that
the power to regulate commerce in some circumstances was held by the
States and Congress concurrently."94  After briefly summarizing the
Dormant Commerce Clause's rules, the Court addressed the state taxation
analysis under Complete Auto, Quill, and Bellas Hess.95 The Court's
86. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2018). As the majority
notes, the state's sales and use taxes "account for over 60 percent of its general fund." Id.
87. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2016) (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089. The law provides that "the state may bring a
declaratory judgment action under [this provision] in any circuit court against any person
the state believes meets the criteria.., to establish that the obligation ... is applicable and
valid under state and federal law." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-3 (2016).
90. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089.
91. Id.
92. State v. Wayfair Inc., 901 N.W.2d 754, 761 (S.D. 2017).
93. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088.
94. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090 (citing Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829)).
95. Id. at 2091-92.
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conclusion that Quill should be overruled can be summarized in its own
terms:
First, the physical presence rule is not a necessary interpretation of the
requirement that a state tax must be "applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State." Second, Quill creates rather than
resolves market distortions. And third, Quill imposes the sort of arbitrary,
formalistic distinction that the Court's modem Commerce Clause
precedents disavow. 96
The Court did not really answer why the physical presence rule is not
a necessary component of "substantial nexus." It only stated that "[o]ther
aspects of the Court's [Commerce Clause] doctrine can better and more
accurately address any potential burdens on interstate commerce, whether
or not Quill's physical presence rule is satisfied." 97 The market distortion,
of course, is the tax shelter created under Quill. As for the formalistic rule,
the Court poses a hypothetical of a small business owner with a warehouse
in South Dakota being economically disadvantaged by the state tax, while a
big business with a major online presence in South Dakota, but no physical
presence there, avoids the South Dakota tax altogether. 98 This, the majority
concluded, "is artificial in its entirety." 99  The Court then expressly
overruled both Quill and Bellas Hess.l°° Concluding under the Complete
Auto "substantial nexus" test that "the economic and virtual contacts" of
the businesses "clearly" satisfy the requirements under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, the Court upheld the South Dakota legislation.' 01
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, in which he agreed that
the physical presence rule "can no longer be rationally justified."1 °2 He
96. Id. at 2092 (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 2093. In this section, the Court also addresses the overlap between the
Commerce Clause and Due Process. As mentioned earlier, supra note 78, I will not address
Due Process as it relates to the Commerce Clause. It is worth noting, however, that the
majority's conclusion that physical presence is not necessary to establish a substantial nexus
seems to be chiefly based on the premise that because physical presence is not required to
establish personal jurisdiction over a business, it should also not be required for this analysis
under the Commerce Clause. While there are "significant parallels" between Due Process
and the Commerce Clause, they are concerned with two very different constitutional
protections (protection for the person/entity, and protection for congressional power,
respectively). Id. Thus, there is no reason why what is required for Due Process should
necessarily mandate the requirements, or lack thereof, for the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Consequently, the majority's argument to this point is precarious at best.
98. Id. at 2095.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2099.
101. Id. at 2099-100.
102. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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also noted that he would throw out the "entire negative Commerce Cause
jurisprudence."'0 3 Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate concurrence to say that
"[w]hether and how much of [the Dormant Commerce Clause] can be
squared with the text of the Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or
defended as misbranded products of federalism... are questions for
another day."" 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The dissent, in an echo of the
Quill opinion, stressed the importance of Congress's role in deciding
whether the physical presence rule should be discarded, stating that
"[u]nder our dormant Commerce Clause precedents, when Congress has
not yet legislated on a matter of interstate commerce, it is the province of
'the courts to formulate the rules."" 5 Moreover, "because Congress 'has
plenary power to regulate commerce among the States,' it may at any time
replace such judicial rules with legislation of its own." 1°6 In fact, Chief
Justice Roberts stressed, Congress has considered passing legislation which
would change or remove the physical presence requirement altogether:
"Three bills addressing the issue are currently pending. Nothing in today's
decision precludes Congress from continuing to seek a legislative solution.
But by suddenly changing the ground rules, the Court may have waylaid
Congress's consideration of the issue."7 Finally, the dissent recognized
the practical effect of the majority's decision, explaining that "[t]he burden
will fall disproportionately on small businesses.. . . People starting a
business selling their embroidered pillowcases or carved decoys can offer
their wares throughout the country-but probably not if they have to figure
out the tax due on every sale."' 08
Thus, the dissent focused on three key flaws in the majority's
argument: (1) while the Court has the power to overrule past decisions,
Congress is in the best position to address this issue; (2) Congress has
already begun to take action addressing this issue, so this decision is
unnecessarily rash; and, (3) the burden of this decision will fall largely on
small businesses who cannot or will not take on the burden of calculating
the sales tax for every state in which it does business.10 9 Important to the
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2100-01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 2102 (Roberts, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, J.J., dissenting) (quoting S. Pac.
Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945)).
106. Id. (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (citation
omitted)).
107. Id. at 2102-03 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 2104.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
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dissent's reasoning was the doctrine of stare decisis-that this was the third
chance the Court had to reconsider the physical presence rule, and that
because the Court had upheld the rule twice before, Congress had relied on
the Court's previous position so that it could consider future legislation on
that issue. 110 Justice Roberts observed that "[w]hatever salience the adage
'third time's a charm' has in daily life, it is a poor guide to Supreme Court
decisionmaking."' 1  Ultimately, the dissenting Justices would have "let
Congress decide whether to depart from the physical-presence rule that has
governed this area for half a century." '112 I argue that the dissent's
deference to Congress was the right decision. Because the Court
improperly concluded that the physical presence rule was "unsound and
incorrect," 113 Bellas Hess and Quill should not have been overruled.
III. WAYFAIR'S IMPLICATIONS AND THE AMAZON ARGUMENT
The Wayfair decision sticks a Band-Aid on states' dwindling tax base
problem. The majority touts its decision by holding itself out as a victory
for states' rights, and the concurring Justices' opinions criticize the
Dormant Commerce Clause for suppressing the states' ability to legislate.
However flawed the physical presence rule may be, and regardless of the
tax shelter that it creates, the Wayfair Court improperly took it upon itself
the responsibility of solving the issues of all states across the entire
country. Such a dramatic change in the law has drastic effect in the
practical application of commerce power and in the theoretical application
of federalism. I will address just a few of these problems.
A. Implications for Small Businesses
As the public recognized before the Wayfair decision, and as Chief
Justice Roberts recognized in the dissent, overruling Quill and Bellas Hess
will leave an unjustifiably heavy burden on small businesses.1 4 Steve
Forbes argued that "[s]upporters of an internet sales tax argue that the Quill
case was decided at a time when mail-order catalogues fueled remote
110. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2102 (Roberts, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, J.J. dissenting).
The Court's previous two chances to consider the physical presence rule are, of course,
Quill and Bellas Hess.
111. Id.
112. Id. at2104-05.
113. Id. at 2099 (majority opinion).
114. Id. at 2103 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court... breezily disregards the costs
that its decision will impose on retailers.").
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shopping and is now outdated in the Internet age." 115 However, as Forbes
noted, "while the method may have changed, the concept has not, and an
Internet sales tax is bad policy with far-reaching and negative
ramifications. Suddenly, small businesses with just a handful of employees
would have to comply with over 10,000 state and local taxing
jurisdictions."" 6
The Wayfair majority appears to have considered this argument
through its use of a hypothetical:
Consider, for example, two businesses that sell furniture online. The first
stocks a few items of inventory in a small warehouse in North Sioux City,
South Dakota. The second uses a major warehouse just across the border in
South Sioux City, Nebraska, and maintains a sophisticated website with a
virtual showroom accessible in every State, including South Dakota. By
reason of its physical presence, the first business must collect and remit a
tax on all of its sales to customers from South Dakota, even those sales that
have nothing to do with the warehouse. :.. But, under Quill, the second,
hypothetical seller cannot be subject to the same tax for the sales of the
same items made through a pervasive Internet presence. 117
In this hypothetical, the small business with a warehouse in South
Dakota would have to pay taxes in South Dakota, while the big business
with no warehouses in the state gets off scot-free.
This proposition is what I call the "Amazon argument:" the idea that
fixing the tax shelter created under the physical presence rule can only hurt
the large, sophisticated businesses that are fiendishly avoiding having to
pay taxes, and will heroically save the mom-and-pop shops that are being
crushed by state taxes. Certainly, there is nothing inherently wrong with
this hypothetical, and it appears to afford proper consideration to the
realistic possibility that a large business with the means to avoid state taxes
can and will do so. It is true that under Quill, the small businesses in South
Dakota have had to pay South Dakota taxes while Wayfair and other large
companies have taken advantage of a loophole in the physical presence rule
by remaining out of the state. Note, however, that the large business in the
majority's hypothetical remains subject to North Dakota's tax laws,
pursuant to the physical presence rule, while the small business would be
allowed to send mail-order catalogues to potential customers just across the
North Dakota border without having to pay any North Dakota taxes. Thus,
a flaw in the majority's argument is the false presumption that the physical
presence rule allows large businesses to avoid state taxes completely, while
115. Steve Forbes, Steve Forbes: Internet Sales Tax Would be Fatal for Small
Businesses, Fox NEWS (June 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/9B7J-MPGK (italics added).
116. Id.
117. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (majority opinion).
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small businesses almost never benefit. The real problem, however, with
the majority's reliance on its hypothetical to abolish the physical presence
rule, is that it ignores the flip side of the coin-that is, that many small
sellers with no warehouses in South Dakota will also have to pay taxes to
South Dakota, simply because they sell to South Dakota customers online
or through mail-orders. Those small businesses may not be able to bear the
brunt of the cost.
The majority also finds it important that the South Dakota tax has
some safeguards in place for small businesses: the tax applies only to those
who do some sort of business in South Dakota, it may not be applied
retroactively, and the system which "standardizes taxes to reduce
administrative and compliance costs."1"8 Furthermore, "[t]he law at issue
requires a merchant to collect the tax only if it does a considerable amount
of business in the State." '119 The adequacy of the "degree of protection"
afforded small businesses in the South Dakota law has been settled by the
Wayfair Court, but it leaves much to be desired. 2 ° For example, the
conditions in place for the South Dakota tax to apply are (1) the entity
collects $100,000 in gross revenue from business conducted in South
Dakota, or, (2) the entity conducts 200 or more separate transactions for
goods or services into South Dakota within one year's time. 121 The Court
concludes that this constitutes a considerable amount of business. 122
However, with the prevalence of online shopping, this premise is dubious.
Now, imagine that person X is a college student who takes pictures in
his spare time and sells those pictures as wall ddcor on a website he
created. He initially sells to friends and family, but over time he gains a
little notoriety on social media (his pictures are particularly trendy).
Seemingly overnight, he gets 300 orders from South Dakota alone. As a
result, this college student's photography in his spare time must comply
with South Dakota's individual tax requirements if he chooses to fill all
300 orders from South Dakota. Imagine now that he begins conducting
transactions with people from twenty states (only a moderate amount,
considering that this is not even half of the country), each with its own tax
laws. South Dakota's safe harbor is that he must conduct at least 200
transactions within South Dakota, but maybe another state's law says only
100 transactions are sufficient to trigger its taxes. How long will this seller
118. Id.at2100.
119. Id. at 2098 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. S.D. CODWIED LAWS § 10-64-2 (2016).
122. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 ("This quantity of business could not have occurred
unless the seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on business in South
Dakota.").
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be able to keep up with this system? How many different tax laws will he
have to consider when it comes time to pay those taxes, and how long will
that take? He will almost certainly have to hire expert services to help him
pay the various taxes. Will he be able to afford to pay for those services,
and if he can, will it be worth his time and money? Are 100 transactions
within one state still a considerable amount of business, justifying his
paying that state's taxes?
The Court's hypothetical presents valid concerns, but it does not
answer every question, nor solve every problem. Ann Whitley Wood, an
attomey-turned-eBay-seller, describes a problem not discussed by the
Wayfair majority-that is, the problem of a small online seller who cannot
afford to keep up with the many tax regulations in every state where a
buyer resides.'23 Wood explains, "I pay taxes on in-state sales, a quarterly
chore that eats up a total of one business day a year. If I had to do the same
for 44 other states, the task of tracking my state sales taxes would consume
45 business days a year."' 12 4 The process is not only time-consuming, but is
also complicated. Thus, Wood states, "[s]oftware may help, but given the
complexity of state tax codes, I would have to spend significant time
reviewing my compliance with each state's requirements .... No software
can eliminate my need to respond personally to each and every audit."125
The Wayfair majority brushes this argument aside in a hollow
assurance:
These burdens may pose legitimate concerns in some instances, particularly
for small businesses that make a small volume of sales to customers in
many States. State taxes differ, not only in the rate imposed but also in the
categories of goods that are taxed and, sometimes, the relevant date of
purchase. Eventually, software that is available at a reasonable cost may
make it easier for small businesses to cope with these problems. 1
26
But, as the dissent notes, "the software said to facilitate compliance is
still in its infancy, and its capabilities and expense are subject to debate." '127
Thus, the Court justifies overruling the physical presence rule based on an
incomplete hypothetical and a hope that software will eventually be
sufficient to carry the burdens of this decision.128 This is not a satisfactory
reason to abandon established precedent and the "constitutional default
123. Ann Whitley Wood, Please, Your Honors, Don't Put Me Out of Business, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 16, 2018 5:55 PM ET), https://perma.cc/S6BS-SHS8.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098.
127. Id. at 2104 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2098 (majority opinion).
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rule." '129 Moreover, while South Dakota provided a system in an effort to
simplify compliance and minimize costs, there is no guarantee (or
requirement) that any other states do the same. Thus, in an attempt to fix
the tax shelter created under Quill, the Court resigns small businesses to a
future of complex tax systems with no real assurance that they will be able
to survive the associated costs. This is an unwarranted burden to place on
businesses, simply because Amazon, Wayfair, and other large corporations
avoided state taxes under the physical presence rule.
B. Implications for Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Even if we concede that allowing states to require this kind of tax is
the right thing to do, 3° we still must recognize that the Court's sweeping
aside of established Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence will have a
detrimental effect on the constitutional protections afforded to Congress
through the Commerce Clause.
The Dormant Commerce Clause is the result of a practical assessment
of the need for uniformity among the states. This is evidenced, in part, by
the addition of the Commerce Clause to the Constitution; the Articles of
Confederation did not afford Congress this authority.131 Furthermore, the
Court has consistently acted "as the front line of review in this limited
sphere" '32 because "[t]he economy is better off if state and local laws
impeding interstate commerce are invalidated." '133 In a well-stated quote,
the Court explained how the Dormant Commerce Clause is embodied in the
Framers' expectations:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and
every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will
have free access to every market in the Nation, [and] that.. . no foreign
state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every
consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in
the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of
the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it
reality. 134
129. Id. at2096.
130. Whether one supports the reasoning behind the Wayfair decision seems to be
heavily influenced by one's political identity. See, e.g., Matt Lavietes, A Trump Attack on
an Amazon 'Scam' is Dividing Wealthy Democrats and Republicans: CNBC Survey Reveals,
CNBC (June 28, 2018 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/VV7G-L67W (explaining that when
people do not have an opinion on a complex question, they will "cue" on a political party).
131. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781.
132. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096.
133. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 446.
134. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
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While the Court has given state taxation a unique rule under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 1 it is still governed by the rationale which
governs all Dormant Commerce Clause cases. This rationale is the theory
that if states could act in such a way which would infringe on Congress's
Commerce power, there would no longer be certainty in the market. In
sum, the probability that, without the Dormant Commerce Clause, states
would openly burden the market in order to benefit its own local market is
simply too great to allow.
By overruling Quill and Bellas Hess, the Court did away with a
bright-line rule which ensured that a state would not step on Congress's
toes. This bright-line rule also recognized the realities of doing business in
a competitive market. Thus, the rule under those cases was cognizant that
"[c]ommercial interests are in the marketplace to compete and to win
against their competitors. As competitors, some reasonable carrying charge
or tax for conducting business within a state is quite reasonable."' 36 The
physical presence rule set a clear boundary, however, by not allowing "tax
measures that alter the competitive playing field so that the rules benefit
local residents."' 37  The majority retreats to the general rule under
Complete Auto which states that there need only be a substantial nexus.'38
However, the Court does not attempt to give any guidance regarding what
would constitute a substantial nexus. Rather, all that is said is that "[s]uch
a nexus is established when the taxpayer [or collector] avails itself of the
substantial privilege of carrying on business in that jurisdiction."' 139 If the
Court is concerned that the changing times can no longer support Quill and
Bellas Hess, it does little to justify today's use of the previous rule under
Complete Auto.
What is "substantial nexus" in the era of internet and widespread
online purchases? No one could plausibly deny that companies like
Amazon have a prolific presence, even in states where they have no
physical presence. But what about the person selling goods on Etsy14 or
135. In other words, the physical presence rule, along with the other requirements from
Complete Auto.
136. Twyman, Jr., supra note 62, at 399.
137. Id.
138. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
139. Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
140. ETSY, http://www.etsy.com (last visited May 2, 2019). Etsy is a company that
allows people to sell goods through its website for a small fee. See Etsy: About, ETSY,
https://perma.cc/U6FC-CT9D (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
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eBay? 14 1 Under Quill, a straight-forward rule existed that allowed small
sellers to conduct business with certainty, efficiency, and uniformity.
Although the majority finds the rule "anachronistic,"' 142 the rationale
remains the same as it was in the days of mail-order catalogues. In Quill,
the out-of-state business sent mail, made telephone calls, and sold goods
into the state through the mail. 43 Today, many companies advertise via the
internet, as well as mail, and ship the goods to the customer. Thus, "while
the method may have changed, the concept has not."'" The Wayfair
decision has left many questions, and the Court is not the appropriate entity
to create them.
C. Implications for Federalism
Finally, the Wayfair decision is frankly problematic for federalism.
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Court must decide whether a
state has acted in a way which conflicts with a power Congress could
assert. This is, admittedly, a usual task for the judiciary, whose role
traditionally is "to say what the law is., '145 However, this function has
proven to be key in preserving federalism.
The Constitution expressly grants Congress the authority to regulate
interstate commerce. 146 Thus, when one state infringes on that power, it
disrupts the uniformity that would result from national legislation affecting
all states. This uniformity is essential because the national government
represents people of all states; when a state imposes a burden on other
states, it imposes a burden on people and businesses who do not have
representation in that state, so that it alone will benefit. This is entirely
inconsistent with federalism: "State protectionism is unacceptable because
it is inconsistent with the very idea of political union, even a limited federal
union. Protectionist legislation is the economic equivalent of war. It is
hostile in its essence."' 147 Moreover, while Congress has the authority to
invalidate any law which it finds tramples on its own authority, "it is
unrealistic to expect Congress to review the vast array of state and local
141. Similar to Etsy, eBay is a website that charges a fee for users to advertise and sell
goods through its website. See All About Selling, EBAY INC., https://perma.cc/7L72-2DU5
(last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
142. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095.
143. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992).
144. Forbes, supra note 115.
145. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Of course, saying what
the law is naturally presupposes that there is a federal law to interpret.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
147. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1113 (1986).
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laws that might be challenged as burdening interstate commerce." 14 8
Consequently, the Dormant Commerce Clause is meant to reserve to
Congress what is, at its core, a national question, and the judiciary's role in
that task is to ensure that states comply with this overall scheme of
federalism.
The physical presence rule preserved that notion. Under Quill and
Bellas Hess, states could exercise their sovereignty by taxing the most
pervasive business going on within its border, while leaving that which was
wholly interstate to Congress. 149 The rule is also simple and easy to
comprehend, allowing states and businesses across the country to fully
understand the consequences of doing business in a particular state. The
Wayfair decision has done away with the simplicity of the physical
presence rule. Now, states can impose a world of differing taxes on out-of-
state businesses who did not vote for those taxes.
It is imperative to note that Congress has considered legislation that
would allow states to tax out-of-state businesses for business conducted
within its borders. 151 It is important because such legislation would be
representative of the nation and would conform with the Constitution. In
Wayfair, the Court acts with a "sense of urgency," as if Congress might
never answer affirmatively "yes" or "no." 151 This gives individual states
the green light to act irrespective of "whether or not Congress can or will
act in response." '1 2  However, as the dissent notes, Congress has been
considering such legislation for years, and three bills have been
introduced. 53 What, then, is the point of the Wayfair decision when
Congress is in the midst of answering this very question? Whatever the
point, the ultimate result is that states can now act in such a way that has
been constitutionally and historically reserved for Congress. Moreover,
states are free to do so without any reliable standard to guide them.
148. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 448.
149. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Dep't of Revenue of lll., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
150. See infra note 153.
151. South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2103 (2018) (Roberts, Breyer,
Sotomayor, Kagan, J.J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2097 (majority opinion).
153. Id. at 2102 (Roberts, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, J.J., dissenting). Congress
considered the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017, S. 976, 115th Cong. (2017), No
Regulation Without Representation Act, H.R. 2887, 115th Cong. (2017), and the Remote
Transactions Parity Act of 2017, H.R. 2193, 115th Cong. (2017).
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IV. WHAT WE CAN Do Now
Because the Supreme Court has ruled that states may tax out-of-state
businesses which do not have a physical presence in that state, nothing
short of a constitutional amendment or a new ruling from the Court will
overturn this decision. 5 4 A new Court ruling is probably the easiest route
to have the Wayfair decision overruled, but it is unlikely. The Court
adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis, "a judicial doctrine under which a
court follows the principles, rules, or standards of its prior decisions." '155
The Court does not overrule prior decisions unless there is a "'special
justification'- or, at least, 'strong grounds" to do so. 156 Consequently,
stare decisis is a doctrine which helps the Court remain reliable, stable, and
predictable.'57 In sum, while the Court is theoretically bound by stare
decisis, the Court is also free to stray from old rules and standards so long
as it finds sufficient justification, as the Wayfair decision demonstrates. 5 '
However, with the new makeup of the Court, the opportunity to overrule
the Wayfair decision remains doubtful, at least for several decades. The
conservative-leaning justices of the Wayfair Court, and Justice Ginsburg,
agreed that the physical presence rule should no longer stand, while the
left-leaning justices-along with Chief Justice Roberts-would have kept
the Quill and Bellas Hess test. 15 9 The departure of Justice Kennedy, a
notorious swing vote, and the addition of Justice Kavanaugh, who holds
154. For an informal but accurate discussion of judicial review and the power of the
United States Supreme Court's rulings, see generally The Court and Constitutional
Interpretation, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://perma.cc/MXH9-A2ZE (last
visited May 2, 2019). As this source notes, "When the Supreme Court rules on a
constitutional issue, that judgment is virtually final; its decisions can be altered only by the
rarely used procedure of constitutional amendment or by a new ruling of the Court." Id.
Note that another available solution to the Wayfair decision would be Congress passing
legislation requiring the physical presence rule. Indeed, Congress was already considering
laws touching on this issue. See supra note 153. Because the legislation considered would
actually do away with the physical presence rule, the likelihood of Congress actually
undoing the Wayfair decision through legislation is doubtful. However, this does remain a
possibility, and I recognize the validity of this avenue.
155. Brandon J. Murrill, The Supreme Court's Overruling of Constitutional Precedent,
CONG. RES. SERV. 4 (Sept. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/WX9D-5268.
156. Id. (footnote omitted).
157. For further discussion of stare decisis, see generally id.
158. South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018) ("Although we approach
the reconsideration of our decisions with the utmost caution, stare decisis is not an
inexorable command." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159. See id. at 2080.
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conservative views, means that the likelihood Wayfair would be
reconsidered in the coming years is slim. 16
A constitutional amendment is always a possibility. However, passing
a constitutional amendment is no easy task. 16 1  An amendment can be
passed in two ways: by two-thirds vote of both the House and the Senate,
or by two-thirds of the states. 162 In practice, however, the possibility that a
constitutional amendment will pass to overturn a Supreme Court decision is
largely theoretical. 63  Thus, while it is possible that the Court could
overrule itself and that the Constitution is amended, neither of these results
is likely.
Ultimately, then, the states are now free to make the decision whether
they will tax out-of-state businesses. It is undeniable that the state
legislatures feel deeply the diminishing tax bases are the result of the
shelter created under Quill and Bellas Hess. In response, states like South
Dakota are now free to create legislation, which imposes such sales and use
taxes on big and small businesses alike. However, this is not a necessary
result. States have wide control over who they tax, how much they tax, and
why they tax. If the state legislators feel that the state's tax base is
slipping, they can adjust the taxing scheme to make up for lost revenue.
However, because the Wayfair decision gives states an "easy" fix that will
significantly affect many businesses in the country, it now falls on the
people of each state to vote for representatives who will uphold the
traditional and constitutional form of federalism, which is so entrenched in
our history and in our lives. The Court has not mandated that states impose
these taxes. Rather, the only necessary conclusion of the Wayfair decision
is that, in the Supreme Court's eyes, Congress can no longer be trusted to
160. National concern over a more conservative Court "than at any other time in modem
history" was at a high during Justice Kavanaugh's confirmation. See, e.g., Adam Liptak,
Confirming Kavanaugh: A Triumph for Conservatives, but a Blow to the Court's Image,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/XRN7-ZGWM ("The [C]ourt, in other words,
will perfectly reflect the deep polarization of the American public and political system.").
161. The most recent amendment, the Twenty-seventh, was ratified in 1992. See
generally Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 497 (1992). This amendment, which provides
that members of Congress will not be paid until the next term of office for Representatives
occurs, took over two hundred years to ratify, as it was first proposed in 1789. Id. at 498.
162. U.S. CONST. art. V.
163. Only five Supreme Court decisions have been overruled by constitutional
amendment. Murrill, supra note 155, at 9. For an overview of these cases, see id. at 9 n.54.
One such instance is the Eleventh Amendment, which overruled Chisolm v. Georgia. U.S.
CONST. amend. XI (stating that the federal courts do not have the power to hear disputes
arising when a citizen sues a state); Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)
(holding that the federal courts could hear disputes arising when a citizen sues a state).
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determine the economic needs of the nation as a whole. Therefore, it is
now our responsibility to use the democratic process to undo the damage
the Wayfair decision has done. We must vote for representatives in our
state legislatures who refuse to impose taxes on out-of-state businesses.
CONCLUSION
The Wayfair decision flies in the face of over two hundred years of
Dormant Commerce Clause precedent and several decades of precedent
regarding state taxation. This is a concerning shift in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence that marks a step away from federalism and a step toward
unwarranted discrimination across state lines. Even more concerning is the
lasting result it will have on small businesses, who will inevitably have to
absorb the cost of complying with so many differing regulations or close up
shop entirely. However, of all the concerns the decision has created, most
concerning is the way in which the Wayfair Court so hastily brushed aside
the Constitution and the clear authority it grants to Congress. The physical
presence rule established in Quill and Bellas Hess appropriately addressed
each of these concerns, giving respect to the powers of both the states and
Congress. Consequently, the Court's overruling of these cases and its
reversion back to the substantial nexus requirement will only cause
confusion and inconsistency for scholars, legislators, and business owners
across the country.
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